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Fall 1987

A SYMPOSIUM ON SPECIAL
PROSECUTIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
INTRODUCTION
Eugene Gressman*
This symposium is most timely. It comes on the eve of a major
Supreme Court evaluation, in constitutional terms, of the role of the
special prosecutor, called an independent counsel in modern federal
parlance. In a case to be known as Morrison v. Olson,' the Court
* A.B., 1938, J.D., 1940, Univ. of Michigan; Richard J. Hughes Visiting Professor of
Law, Seton Hall Univ. School of Law; William Rand Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus, Univ.
of North Carolina School of Law; co-author, R. STERN. E. GRESSMAN, S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE (6th ed. 1986); counsel for U.S. House of Representatives in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
1. 56 U.S.L.W. 3568 (Feb. 22, 1988)(probable jurisdiction noted). Alexia Morrison, the
independent counsel appointed in this case under the Ethics in Government Act, took an appeal to the Supreme Court from a divided panel ruling of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, holding Title VI of the Ethics Act unconstitutional. See In re Sealed
Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). The proceedings in
the circuit court took the form of appeals by three former Department of Justice officials
(Theodore B. Olson, Carol E. Dinkins, and Edward C. Schmults) from a district court order
holding the officials in civil contempt for failing to answer subpoenas issued by the independent
counsel. The subpoenas directed the officials to testify before a grand jury investigating their
actions while in office. The three officials at each juncture of the contempt proceedings contended that the Act on which the independent counsel's authority is based is unconstitutional.
The 2 to I ruling of the court of appeals was entered on January 22, 1988. On February
22, 1988, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal and set oral argument
for April 26, 1988, following an expedited briefing schedule. The Court noted that Justice
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the order noting jurisdiction or the
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will examine the constitutionality of Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act,2 which establishes the office and duties of the independent counsel.
Special prosecutorial offices, insulated from political interference, have played a long and honored role in American history at
federal, state and local levels. 3 But it is the federal prosecutorial sector that has witnessed the most dramatic increase in the use of this
special office.
Much of that increased use is due to a growing public sensitivity, generated by the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s, to perceived unethical and illegal conduct of officials high in the echelons
of the executive branch.4 A critical aspect of the Watergate affair
had been the influence of White House staff and political appointees
in the Justice Department over the Department's investigations of
high officials within the executive branch. The Watergate experience, said the Senate Watergate Committee, "raises a serious question as to whether high Department of Justice officials can effectively
administer criminal justice where White House personnel, or the
President himself, are the subjects of the investigation."'
After extensive hearings dealing with the constitutional and legal implications of creating the office of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute Watergate-like matters, Congress in 1978
enacted the Ethics in Government Act. The statute has been re-endorsed twice through reauthorizations in 19836 and 1987.7 It represents a carefully crafted response to the extraordinary problem of
investigating and prosecuting high executive branch officials suspected of unethical or illegal conduct in office.
The Act is designed as a check or balance against the unseemly
motion to expedite the briefing and oral argument schedule; he had joined the Court just a day
before these preliminary matters were considered by the Court.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982).
3. See Levin, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and
ConstitutionalBalance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11, 11-20 (1987) (discussing the historical origins of the use of special prosecutors on the federal level); Kurlander & Friedlander, Perilous
Executive Power-Perspectiveon Special Prosecutorsin New York, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv.35
(1987)(discussing the historical origins of the New York statute).
4. For a detailed discussion of the Watergate scandel as the primary impetus for the
Ethics in Government Act, see Levin, supra note 3, at 11-20.
5. The Final Report of the Senate Select Comm. on PresidentialCampaign Activities,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1974).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1982).
7. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
1293, 1306 (1987)(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 591-99).
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spectacle of executive branch prosecutors making final prosecutorial
decisions respecting high ranking executive branch officers, including
the prosecutors' own superiors. As the Act provides, if the Attorney
General's preliminary investigation reveals "reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted," 8 such
further and final prosecutorial decisions should not and need not be
made by Justice Department prosecutors appointed by, answerable
to, and removable at the whim of the President of the United States.
It strains public credulity to have executive branch watchmen ultimately watching themselves. As former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox once remarked, "[t]he pressures, the tensions of
divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as honorable and
conscientious as any individual might be, the public could never feel
entirely easy about the vigor and thoroughness with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is absolutely essential.",
The "outside person" employed by the Ethics Act is known as
an "independent counsel," appointed by a special federal court on
application of the Attorney General. Such an application can be
made only if the Attorney General concludes, following his own preliminary inquiry, that the situation is serious enough to warrant further investigation and possible prosecution. As investigations conducted by these court-appointed counsel have mounted during the
Reagan years, so too have risen constitutional challenges to the Act
and to the role and function of the independent counsel. The challengers include not only those present and former executive branch
officials currently targeted for inquiry and investigation by independent counsel but also the executive branch itself. The Department of
Justice, represented in the Morrison proceedings in the Supreme
Court by the Solicitor General of the United States, has become the
most prominent challenger."0
8. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).
9. Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S.2803 and
S.2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powersof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1974).
10. This has not always been so. During the Carter years, when the Ethics Act was
being formulated, a Department of Justice representative testified that the President, the Attorney General and the Department fully supported the proposed legislation. He indicated that

the Department had "no objections to the manner in which the appointment process is initiated, the method of judicial appointment, or the restrictions placed on the Executive's power of

removal over the special prosecutor .

. .

.We believe that judicial appointment is justified by

the Appointments Clause, Article II, section 2 ....
" Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977
Blind Trusts and other Conflict of Interest Matters: Hearings on S.555 Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1977)(testimony of John M.
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The executive branch enters this battle holding high the banner
of the separation of powers doctrine. Drawing support from such recent decisions as INS v. Chadha11 and Bowsher v. Synar,12 the executive branch takes a highly simplistic and literal approach to the
separation doctrine. Under that view, all executive-type functions are
vested by Article II of the Constitution in the executive branch, performable only by those totally subservient to the Executive. But
neither of the doctrinal fathers, Montesquieu or Madison, ever articulated the doctrine in such rigid terms. As Madison explained in
The Federalist No. 47,13 the doctrine means only that the "whole"
power of one branch ought not to be exercisable by another branch.
The doctrine does not require, in the words of The Federalist No.
48,'" that the branches "be wholly unconnected with each other[;]
unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation
which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can
never in practice be duly maintained."" 5 In other words, the doctrine
does not hermetically divide the three basic functions of government
so as to preclude whatever blending or checking is deemed necessary
to prevent unhealthy concentrations of power in one branch. That is
what the concept of checks and balances is all about. And that is
what is at the heart of the delegation doctrine, whereby Congress
delegates or dispenses some - but not all - of one or more of the
three functions (usually called "quasi-functions") to agencies independent of the Executive.
The arguments projected by the executive branch in the Morrison case reflect no real appreciation of the flexible and "blended"
nature of the separation doctrine. But then, neither did the Supreme
Court in Chadha or Bowsher. In both cases the Court roundly rejected any notion of shared powers in the absence of express constitutional provision, while railing against the dangers of legislative tyranny and despotism. 16 We can only guess how the Court will treat
the separation doctrine in Morrison, although the context in which
Harmon, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice). Similar supportive testimony was received from the American Bar Association and from the deans
of 49 law schools.
11. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
12, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
13. at 302 (J.Madison)(Lodge ed. 1888).
14. (J.Madison)(Lodge ed. 1888).
15. Id. at 308.
16. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949; Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189.
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the problem is presented is somewhat different.
Nowhere is this separation misconception more evident than in
the executive branch's argument stemming from the fact that Article
II vests in the Executive the duty to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." 17 The argument is that the Executive can
"faithfully execute" federal criminal laws, even as to those in high
executive office, only if the executive branch prosecutors retain exclusive power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute,
alleged violations of those laws. Such investigative and prosecutorial
powers are said to be "core" executive functions that cannot be
blended with, delegated to, or performed by any officer outside the
executive branch. Thus, in the executive's view, a statute that purports to authorize performance of these functions by an officer not
appointed by and controlled by the Executive is unconstitutional.,,
Underlining the fact that the Morrison case is another chapter
in the long standing feud between the legislative and executive
branches respecting the nature of the separation doctrine, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives appear in the case as amici
curiae in support of the independent counsel's defense of the Ethics
Act. These two legislative protagonists come to the fray armed with
several constitutional weapons.
The Senate and the House have traditionally viewed the separation doctrine as functional in nature, permitting a blending of governmental powers in the Madisonian sense so as not to "preclude the
establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively."19
Such a blending can be effected by Congress whenever deemed "necessary and proper" in the course of enacting laws, provided that no
other constitutional provision or principle is violated.20 Thus where
the executive branch is perceived to be incapable of faithfully and
even-handedly executing criminal laws respecting actions of high executive branch officials, the blended nature of the separation doctrine
should not prohibit Congress from lodging certain limited investigative and prosecutorial functions in an officer who is truly independent
of executive domination. The argument is that such a limited delegation of prosecutorial functions, made "necessary and proper" by the
unusual conflict of interest within the executive branch, is faithful to
17.

18.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

For a fuller discussion of the Executive's viewpoint, see The Constitutional Validity

of the Ethics in Government Act: Morrison v. Olson, 16
19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).

HOFSTRA

L. REv. 65, 97-130 (1987).

20. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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the separation doctrine.
Additionally, the argument is made that the Ethics Act adheres
to the separation doctrine in the sense that Congress is not thereby
taking unto itself any part - let alone the whole - of the
prosecutorial function. As was true in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor,2 ' the Morrison case "raises no question of the
aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented in
this case is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial
Branch."'22 Thus, the argument goes, the question whether the judiciary's role has been unduly undermined is to be tested by the legislative purpose in enacting the Ethics Act, the extent of its intrusion
into the executive function, and the extent to2 which the affected
function is a "core" function of the Executive. 3
The most potent argument in the legislative arsenal, one that
should dispose of any claim that the judiciary's role has been compromised, is based on an explicit power vested in Congress by the
Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2. The clause begins by
providing that the President shall, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, appoint ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, and "all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." The
clause concludes with this explicit language: "but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments."
The resulting argument is that the independent counsel under
the Ethics Act is truly an "inferior Officer," and therefore Congress
can vest the appointment of such an officer in a court of law. 4
The Ethics Act designates as the appointing court a special
21.
22.

106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
Id. at 3261.

23. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See also Wiener
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). Wiener held that there is a functional and therefore a
constitutional difference between "those who are part of the Executive establishment and those
whose tasks require absolute freedom from Executive interference." Id. at 353. An independent counsel under the Ethics Act would appear to fall within the latter category, at least in
the eyes of Congress.
24.

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)(upholding judicial appointments of election

supervisors); see Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2134
(1987) (approving court-appointed prosecutors of criminal contempts).
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three-judge division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, popularly known as the Special Court.25 The court is composed of three circuit judges, selected by the Chief Justice to serve
for two-year periods. An independent counsel can be appointed only
on application of the Attorney General, following a finding by the
Attorney General that a preliminary investigation provides "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is
warranted." 6 The statute provides for the determination by the Special Court, with the advice of the Attorney General, of the
prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel, as well as a detailed description of counsel's authority and duties.2 7 Finally, provision is made for the removal of an independent counsel other than by
impeachment, i.e., "only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity,
or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
such independent counsel's duties."28 Thus these Ethics Act provisions represent a rather unique blend of governmental functions, a
blend that appears neither to undermine the core functions of any
one branch nor to permit an undue concentration of power in any
one branch. But is this blend constitutional?
The District of Columbia Circuit, in invalidating the Ethics
Act, produced 128 pages of opinions in slip form." The opinion of
the panel majority, written by Judge Silberman, covered 88 pages,
while Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent took 40 pages. Judge Silberman's opinion states that it was sufficient to decide the case "to
hold as we do that the independent counsel is not an inferior officer
and thus falls at minimum within that category of the appointments
clause of 'all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,'" 30 thereby rendering
Ms. Morrison's appointment as independent counsel "constitutionally invalid." 31
This conclusion followed a very literal reading of the language
of the Appointments Clause, which was said to require presidential
appointment not only of ambassadors and Supreme Court justices
25. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
26. Id. § 592(c)(1).
27. Id. § 594.
28. Id. § 596.
29. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (as reported, the opinions cover
more than 57 pages).
30.
31.

Id. at 487.
Id.
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but also all principal officers of the United States, such as departmental heads. Since an independent counsel under the Ethics Act
was found by Judge Silberman to be a principal rather than an inferior officer, Congress was said to be incapable of lodging her appointment in a court of law, as the last part of the Appointments
Clause permits. Obviously this matter of interpreting the clause and
applying it to Ms. Morrison's appointment will be a focal point in
the forthcoming Supreme Court ruling.
Having held that the invalid appointment was sufficient to dispose of the case, the panel majority then indulges in what can be
described as a fit of judicial activism, a rendering of numerous advisory opinions on other constitutional claims raised by the challengers. Judge Silberman's opinion ranges far and wide, finding inter
alia that (1) the Ethics Act interferes with the President's core duty
to faithfully execute laws by means of criminal prosecutions, 32 (2)
the Ethics Act impermissibly limits the President's power to supervise and remove an independent counsel, ignoring the fact that no
attempt had been made to supervise or remove Ms. Morrison,"3 (3)
the Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel for
"good cause," a power not here exercised, is "almost illusory," 34 and
(4) the Ethics Act violates the separation of powers doctrine because
it entrusts a court of law with the executive function of making appointments, as well as
intruding too far into the vested functions of a
"unitary executive." 3 5
The panel opinion seeks to justify this series of advisory opinions
on the theory that if the Supreme Court decides that all these additional claims "must be reached," it will not have to "'either proceed
without the usual benefit of a lower-court opinion or else delay final
disposition by remanding for that purpose.' "36 Whether the Supreme Court will feel compelled to reach these other claims, most of
which do not spring from the facts of the case, is at best problematic. Historically, the Court has followed its own advice "never to
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it [and] never to formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
sub nom.

Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 487 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.O.C.), affid
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986)).
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applied. 37
Make no mistake about it. The Morrison case is but the latest
effort, an aggressive effort, by the Executive to mold the separation
of powers doctrine into a means of inflating the powers of the Executive under the rubric of the vested but imprecise duty to execute the
laws faithfully. The effort succeeded in Chadha and Bowsher. In
each case the Supreme Court read the separation doctrine to mean
that no kind of executive function may be delegated to or performed
by anyone outside the executive branch, thus diminishing some of
the constitutional power of Congress to make modern government
effective and efficient. In light of those precedents, the Court's forthcoming treatment of the separation problem in Morrison is difficult
to predict. Will the Court find that Congress lacks any constitutional
authority under the Appointments Clause or the separation doctrine
to establish an independent mode of inquiry into high executive
crimes and misdemeanors? Or will the Court recognize that Congress has constitutional authority to legislate, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause and as it "thinks proper" under the Appointments Clause, so as to avoid the outrageous spectacle of executive
branch prosecutors, answerable only to the Executive, having total
power to decide whether or not to inquire into or prosecute alleged
crimes committed at the highest executive levels?
To repeat, this symposium comes at a most opportune time. The
discussions herein shed valuable light on the nature and role of the
office of independent counsel, or special prosecutor. A proper understanding of that office is the essential predicate to any assessment of
the constitutional conundrums posed in the Morrison case.

37.

Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
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